20/20 Vision in the Long & Short-Termism Debate
Anne Tucker*
What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions,
individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke
emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually
deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus
regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board
of directors versus the shareholders.1 Too long-term and it is myopia; too
near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the
debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.2
Readers are likely familiar with the characterizations assigned to
either end of the investment time horizon spectrum. Long-termism can be
viewed as a source of sustainable growth, real economy investment, and
durable value for retirement investors. It can also be portrayed as a practice
of myopic, self-serving directors underutilizing existing corporate assets
to protect their power and interests. Short-termism can be seen as the
financialization of corporate management where earnings affect governing
business plans and priorities, eroding the fundamental value and
*Anne M. Tucker, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. On June 4–
6, scholars gathered in Atlanta, Georgia for the ninth annual Berle Symposium. Each Berle symposium
makes its own unique contribution to the study of the modern corporation, and the Berle IX
Symposium follows in this tradition. The Berle IX Symposium focused on investor time horizons and
drew deeply from the wisdom of law, finance, management, and neuroscience reinforcing the
interdisciplinary tradition of the Berle symposia. Years before Charles O’Kelley and I collaborated on
the Berle IX Symposium, I wrote him thanking him for his encouragement in big and small ways, his
generous mentorship, and his work in generating timely scholarship on important corporate law topics.
Those sentiments ring even truer today than when originally written. It is with big shoes to fill, and a
sense of gratitude, that I introduce readers to this collection of scholarship on investor time horizons
produced in conjunction with the Berle IX Symposium.
1. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism-in the Boardroom and in the Courtroom,
68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013).
2. Presidential candidates even invoked investor time horizon concerns over short-termism in
2016 stump speeches and policy reforms. See generally Mark J. Roe, The Imaginary Problem of
Corporate Short-termism, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-imaginaryproblem-of-corporate-short-termism-1439853276; Jim Tankersley, Hillary Clinton has a very
detailed plan for the economy. That may be a problem., WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/07/29/hillary-clinton-has-a-very-detailedplan-for-the-economy-that-may-be-a-problem/?utm_term=.c4658232f4da.
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innovation of corporations. Short-termism can also generate corporate
value for investors, deter managerial myopia or complacency, and
encourage value-unlocking transactions. Navigating the debate feels like
operating a broken compass with conflicting evidence and arguments
pointing in different directions, producing more questions than answers
and leaving one disoriented. The binary policy and value choices between
long- and short-termism strike me as incomplete; investor time horizons
are more nuanced than the black or white dichotomy of long- and shorttermism and their assigned value by supporters and detractors.3
I have come to think of corporate time horizons in terms of 20/20
vision—balanced and clear. Just as individuals need near and far sight to
see correctly, corporate managers also need a clear view of the near and
far term. The ninth annual Berle symposium—the Berle IX Symposium—
provided a platform for interdisciplinary scholars from law, finance,
management, and neuroscience to share their understanding of the
complexity, consequences, and interventions available in the investor time
horizon debate. The Berle IX Symposium and this dedicated Issue are
products of a collaboration between Charles O’Kelley of Seattle
University School of Law’s Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations,
Law, and Society and Georgia State University College of Law. We
invited Berle IX participants to contribute to three main inquiries, which
are each addressed in more detail below: (1) What does it mean to be longor short-termist, and what are the consequences of these time horizons?;
(2) What are the different time horizons that exist among various investors
and the theoretical and empirical bases for identifying the corresponding
interests?; and (3) What governance tools could balance competing
investor time horizons and help corporate management achieve 20/20
vision?4
Owen Jones of Vanderbilt Law School and the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Law & Neuroscience was the aptly cast
Keynote Speaker for Berle IX. Jones shared his seminal work on timeshifted rationality, describing the mismatch between evolved information
processing and current conditions that create irrational behaviors.5 Jones’
speech, the transcript of which is included in this Issue, introduced wisdom
3. In Claire Hill’s article, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, she
makes this point with more wit, passion, and force than I dare attempt. Claire A. Hill, An Identity
Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475 (2018)
[hereinafter Hill, An Identity Theory].
4. Many of the resulting contributions are described below. A complete list of participating
academics and presented papers can be found at https://law.seattleu.edu/centers-and-institutes/berlecenter/symposium/berle-ix [https://perma.cc/4VWC-ZDKZ].
5. Owen Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics
Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. L. REV. 1141 (2001).
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from behavioral biology, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience fields
relevant to temporal processing and choice. Jones’ undeniably
interdisciplinary approach to time horizons, and his pleas for more
research around a converging questions approach,6 set the tone for the
Berle IX Symposium. I trust his transcript will do the same heavy lifting
for this Issue by demonstrating the deep insight available when researchers
invest in examining the underpinnings of problems and collaboratively
explore them across disciplines. We have the same hope for this Issue of
the Seattle University Law Review Berle IX.
LONG-TERMISM, SHORT-TERMISM, & WRONG-TERMISM
Readers looking to orient themselves to the long- and short-termism
debate will glean insights from each contribution in this Issue. A few
articles provide a particularly useful introduction for readers new to the
field. Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe’s Institutional Investors,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Value summarizes the financial
literature, empirical evidence, and the theory on why some investors and
firms are short- or long-term.7 In Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the
Liability Structure of Investor Time Horizons,8 Andrew Verstein offers an
incisive summary of the long- and short-termism debate; he summarizes it
as “principally ask[ing] two questions.”9 First, he asks the empirical
question of whether firms inefficiently telescope their investment
timelines to satisfy impatient patrons—in particular, public shareholders.10
Second, he asks the normative question of whether particular changes—
oftentimes changes to the scope of shareholder influence—are accordingly
justified.11 Verstein challenges readers to think past short- and longtermism and consider whether there is a third category, wrong-termism,
which occurs whenever a particular time period is valued over the return
offered.12 Elisabeth de Fontenay’s The Myth of the Ideal Investor provides
a useful overview of the field and applies long- and short-termism tropes
to different shareholder identities.13

6. Owen Jones, Why Behavioral Economics Isn’t Better & How It Could Be, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (J.C. Teitelbaum & K. Zeiler eds, 2015).
7. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and
Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387 (2018).
8. Andrew Verstein, Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the Liability Structure of Investor
Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 579 (2018).
9. Id. at 580.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally id.
13. Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal Investor, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 425 (2018).
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Claire Hill’s contribution, An Identity Theory of the Short- and LongTerm Investor Debate, highlights the complexity, interdisciplinary nature,
and seeming intractability of the long- versus short-termism debate.14 Hill
draws parallels between the debate about investor time horizons and other
iconic corporate governance debates such as management versus activists
and shareholder versus stakeholder.15 Hill argues that identity affects and
in some ways impedes constructive debate because listeners weight proof
against their prior beliefs.16 Hill urges that persuasion should be the
starting point for building bridges between the two camps.17 Hill
challenges readers to consider that “starting points are both as to matters
of fact—matters that are, in principle, capable of being resolved one way
or the other by some sort of empirical or maybe theoretical
demonstration—and values, which are not capable of this sort of
resolution.”18 Readers of this Issue can judge for themselves the proof,
persuasion, and perspective provided in this collection of contemporary,
interdisciplinary work on the complexity of investor time horizons.
SHAREHOLDER FRAME TIME HORIZONS
Identifying the shareholder interests driving time horizons is a matter
of first principles in any investor time horizon discussion. Shareholders
are not monolithic; they encompass a vast expanse of different identities
and interests including hedge funds, mutual funds, pensions, retail
investors, retirement investors, and everything in between. Berle IX
participants examined shareholder identities, their different time horizons,
and the theoretical and empirical bases for identifying the corresponding
interests.
For example, Elisabeth de Fontenay’s The Myth of the Ideal Investor
unpacks three shareholder architypes—the major mutual fund, the activist
hedge fund, and the private equity fund—and maps their attributes and
behaviors to the long- and short-termism debate.19 Concluding that none
of these archetypes fit the ideal, patient, value-maximizing shareholder, de
Fontenay rejects corporate policy attempts to incubate one investor over
another, instead preferring a diverse and robust corporate finance
ecosystem.20 Noting the temporal time lag between problem identification,

14. Hill, An Identity Theory, supra note 3.
15. Id. at 482–84.
16. See generally id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 480.
19. de Fontenay, supra note 13, at 428.
20. Id. at 425.
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policy solution, and implementation, de Fontenay foreshadows policy
questions raised by the third group of papers addressing interventions.21
Rachelle Sampson & Yaun Shi’s contribution, Are Investor Time
Horizons Shortening?,22 a distillation of their prior empirical,23 offers
empirical evidence of short-termism. For example, Sampson and Shi point
to trends of more transient (short-term) institutional investors from 1980–
2013 over dedicated (long-term) investors. Sampson and Shi investigated
firm-level market discount rates using a capital asset pricing model with
an assumed 5-year ownership and observed increasing market discounts at
both the market and firm levels.24 Sampson & Shi also establish a
relationship between market discounting and short-term oriented
attributes. For example, transient (short-term) investors correlated with
higher discount rates whereas dedicated (long-term) investors correlated
with lower discount rates.25 Additionally, Sampson and Shi correlate
higher discount rates with lower research and development spending, and
higher analyst coverage.26 While Sampson and Shi acknowledge that not
all firms are discounted the same (heterogeneity) and explore the reasons
why some firms are discounted, despite similar attributes, more than
others.27 Sampson and Shi telegraph their empirical findings to broader
questions about optimal time horizons, optimal firm investments, and the
relationship between corporate decisions and national economic health.28
In Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value,
Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe focus on aggregate institutional
investor behavior and introduce a taxonomy of institutional investor
behavior derived from holding periods and activism.29 Cremers and Sepe
focus on information asymmetry as an explanatory force in the long- and
short-termism debate and ask why different firms attract institutional
investors with different investment horizons and levels of shareholder
activism.30 They demonstrate a relationship between increased stock
turnover and poison pill adoptions, increased institutional investors, and
firm age, which connects their observations to information asymmetry

21. Id. at 427–28.
22. Rachelle Sampson & Yuan Shi, Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, 41 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 543 (2018).
23. Rachelle C. Sampson & Yuan Shi, Evidence & Implications of Short-termism in US Public
Capital Markets: 1980-2013 (Oct. 31, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837524.
24. Sampson & Shi, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cremers & Sepe, supra note 7, at 389.
30. Id.
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theories.31 Cremers and Sepe test the influence of staggered boards,
finding no significant impact on institutional investors’ behavior but
finding higher firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q when staggered
boards are combined with patient institutional investors.32 Importantly,
their article posits that staggered boards commit investors to a corporate
strategy and facilitate boards of directors’ focus on long-term value
creation.33 Cremers and Sepe’s contribution demonstrates the value of
cross-discipline conversations.
Harold Weston and Conrad Ciccotello, on the other hand, wield the
heterogeneity of shareholders to argue against shareholder time horizons’
influence over corporate time horizons because any signal as to
shareholder horizons is incomplete and unreliable.34 In Flash Traders
(Milliseconds) to Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges of an
Agency Theory Approach to Governance in the Era of Diverse Investor
Time Horizons, Weston and Ciccotello further their argument by focusing
on other temporal governance claims arising from bond, debt, and contract
rights holders while highlighting the fiction that shareholders are corporate
“owners.”35 Weston and Ciccotello propose an asset-centric vision of
corporate governance and expanded directorial duties shaped in the image
of trustees and as alluded to in in Re Trados Shareholder Litigation.36
These contributions and the conversations during the Berle IX Symposium
underscore how shareholder identities frame time horizon inquiries.
DIFFERENT TIME PERSPECTIVES
Several Berle IX contributions expanded the binary, temporal frames
of long- and short-termism. For example, Jim Hawley and Jon Lukomnik,
in The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern
Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, encourage investors and researchers
to seek beta—market performance as a whole—rather than the
conventional investment model of seeking alpha—abnormal returns above
market averages.37 Hawley and Lukomnik turn modern portfolio theory on
its head by asserting that investment decisions can affect systemic risk and,

31. Id. at 412–14.
32. Id. at 414–16.
33. Id. at 417.
34. Harold Weston & Conrad Ciccotello, Flash Traders (Milliseconds) to Indexed Institutions
(Centuries): The Challenges of an Agency Theory Approach to Governance in the Era of Diverse
Investor Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 615, 618–20 (2018).
35. Id. at 624–25.
36. Id. at 645; In Re Trados, Inc. SH. Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (2013).
37. Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right Questions?
Modern Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 449, 449 (2018).
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therefore, change beta.38 In developing their beta theory, Hawley and
Lukomnik, posit that early adopters of performance-enhancing measures,
like environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG), may generate
alpha.39 When “ESG out-performance is recognized by the larger market,
alpha fades (it regresses to the mean), and ESG’s systemic impact becomes
embedded in equity (and bond) pricing, it becomes part of market beta.”40
It is clear in reading Hawley and Lukomnik’s work that beta matters; it
comprises a significantly greater portion of investment returns than
alpha.41 In connecting their work to time horizons, Hawley and Lukomnik
note that beta investors would be permanent market participants with
constant beta exposure, thus eliminating time horizon pressures driven by
securities.42 Their piece imagines a post-time horizons investment world
where beta management is the catalyst for markets, not time horizons.
Frank Partnoy, drawing upon his book Wait43 in his symposium
contribution, Specificity and Time Horizons, encourages focusing on
investment time horizons separate from investor types or products.44
Partnoy proposes four categories of time horizons: pre-conscious, fastconscious, slow conscious, and discounting.45 Partnoy’s time horizons
span from less than one-half of a second (pre-conscious, algorithmic
trading) to over a year (discounting).46 Temporal categories are related to,
but not dependent upon, investor attributes.47 Partnoy argues that focusing
on the time buckets themselves may help illustrate the appropriate role of
interventions and policy.48 For example, pre-conscious and fast-conscious
time horizons may call for more regulation with decreased private ordering
and greater reliance on bias, whereas slower time categories may be better
suited for private ordering solutions.49 Partnoy links his intuitions about
time categories to juridical doctrines that alternate between short-term
(e.g., zone of insolvency, Revlon) and long-term (e.g., the business
judgment rule).50 Disclosed time categories could aid investors in

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 457.
41. Id. at 449.
42. Id. at 461.
43. FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART & SCIENCE OF DELAY (2013).
44. Frank Partnoy, Specificity and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525 (2018).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 535–37.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 538.
50. Id. (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)).
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identifying temporally matched investments and managers if investment
products made time world disclosures.51
In Federalism of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement
Plans, William Birdthistle, focuses on retirement investors.52 He writes,
In an America in which workers must save—and invest those
savings—in their own retirement accounts without substantial
assistance from pensions or Social Security, the critical time horizon
is the length of the lay-investor’s career. In those four decades or so,
Americans must amass and deploy a nest-egg that will help them to
survive the remaining two decades or so in retirement. The challenges
of this task are enormous.53

Firmly fixing the investment time horizon around the working life of
retirement investors, Birdthistle proposes a federally sponsored thrift
saving account as a retirement saving solution.54 Birdthisle offer a wellconstructed blueprint for the plan with automatic, opt-out contributions;
simulated market scrutiny and competition to keep fees lows because of
the size; and an appropriate focus on maximizing savings for the investors,
not profits for the financial intermediaries.55 Birdthistle’s piece illustrates
the reach of investment time horizon governance questions as an
increasing percentage of American workers save for retirement through
securities investments and what it is at stake if the wrong balance is struck.
Returning to Andrew Verstein’s Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism,
and the Liability Structure of Investor Time Horizons, he offers a third
category to the short- and long-term debate: wrong-termism. Verstein
defines wrong-termism in thought process rather than time, as occurring
whenever decision-makers value a specific time horizon regardless of the
ultimate return. Verstein identifies three sources of wrong-termism, which
emanate from (1) investors as either impatient or irrationally patient, (2)
assets such as debt, Research and Development (R&D) investment or
dividends, and (3) market sources such as activism and market demand.56
Verstein explores specific interventions and focuses on the potential of
liability transfers through fund de-risking.57

51. Id. at 539.
52. William A. Birdthistle, Federalism of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans,
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 367 (2018).
53. Id. at 367.
54. Id. at 370–75.
55. Id.
56. Andrew Verstein, Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the Liability Structure of Investor
Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 579, 594 (2018).
57. Id. at 608.
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TIME HORIZON INTERVENTIONS
Caroline Flammer, in Long-Term Executive Compensation as a
Remedy for Corporate Short-Termism, translates her empirical work in the
management and strategy literature.58 Flammer posits that long-term
executive compensation addresses time-based agency conflicts that arise
when managers’ time preferences are misaligned with those of the
shareholders.59 Newly adopted long-term compensation plans, including
restricted stock, restricted options, and long-term incentive plans, are
correlated with abnormal (high) returns, increased return on assets and net
profit margin, increased R&D expenditures, increased patents and patent
citations, and increased stakeholder engagements.60 Flammer’s work
connects private ordering solutions through employment and
compensation contracts to the public policy questions of optimal corporate
time horizons in decision making and resulting firm value.
In Corporate Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A
Proposal, Lynn Stout and Sergio Gramitto propose a universal fund—a
donation-based equity fund in which all U.S. citizens would receive a
share—as a means to align management time horizons with the time
horizons of investors invested in the market as a whole.61 The proposed
blueprint for the universal fund outlines funding sources (donations),
management, voting rights, and transferability of universal shares.62 Stout
and Gramitto’s universal fund would address more than investor time
horizon conflicts, as it would also address systemic problems such as
income inequality, the need for corporate innovation, and the costs of
negative corporate externalities.63 They write:
[G]overnments are not the only institutions that can solve collective
social and economic problems . . . . Many of today’s corporations
rival nation-states in weight, influence, and reach. Collectively they
control tens of trillions of dollars in assets and affect hundreds of
millions of customers, employees, and shareholders. Indeed, the

58. Caroline Flammer, Long-Term Executive Compensation as a Remedy for Corporate ShortTermism, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 419, 420 (2018) [hereinafter Flammer, Long-Term Executive
Compensation]. For Flammer’s empirical work in management and strategy, see Caroline Flammer &
Pratima Bansal, Does a Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression
Discontinuity, 38 STRATEGIC MAN. J. 1827 (2017).
59. Flammer, Long-Term Executive Compensation, supra note 58, at 420.
60. Id. at 421–22.
61. Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto, Corporate Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy:
A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 551 (2018).
62. Id. at 555–58.
63. Id. at 559–69.
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corporate sector can be analogized to a kind of parallel state or
shadow government that touches all our lives, and on a daily basis.64

More than a thought piece, Stout and Gramitto paint a thoughtprovoking image of corporate securities leveraged for public good.
Jennifer Hill’s Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International
Stewardship Code offers an international perspective on the shareholder
narrative and a path forward in the long- and short-termism debate.65 Hill
focuses on stewardship codes, which provide a framework to constrain
board power through encouraged shareholder votes, proxy access, and
increased activism.66 Hill contrasts the United States perspective on
investor time horizons and shareholders’ appropriate governance roles to
those in the United Kingdom and Japan, as exemplified through their
stewardship codes.67 Hill’s piece demonstrates the breadth of jurisdictions
incorporating stewardship codes, naming nineteen countries with
stewardship codes helpfully organized around the initiating party behind
the code: regulators, industry participants, and investors.68 Hill embraces
a positive view of shareholder activism as an integral component of the
corporate governance system.69
Interventions—of framing and policy—abound in the other works
already mentioned. Weston and Ciccotello envision directors as trustees
after shedding the scaffolded fiction of shareholders as capable of having
a time horizon, as owners, or as principals of the corporation.70 Elisabeth
de Fontenay advocates for no regulatory intervention or preference for
certain investors, instead letting the “eco system” of financial markets
thrive.71 Frank Partnoy frames the issue around time categories, not
investor-driven time horizons, and would encourage disclosures of these
buckets and let investors match themselves with the right temporal
window.72 Birdthistle endorses a federal thrift-saving account as a tool to
protect retirement investors’ saving time horizons.73 Readers can access
full accounts of all suggested interventions in the individual articles.

64. Id. at 552.
65. Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes,
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2018) [hereinafter Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist].
66. Id. at 497–98.
67. Id. at 511–21 (2017); Fin. Reporting Council, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE, July 2010; The
Council of Experts on Japan’s Stewardship Code, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS: JAPAN’S
STEWARDSHIP CODE, Feb. 26, 2014, 1–2.
68. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist, supra note 65, at 505–09.
69. Id. at 521.
70. Weston & Ciccotello, supra note 34, at 634–39.
71. de Fontenay, supra note 13, at 425.
72. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 539–40.
73. Birdthistle, supra note 52.
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CONCLUSION
The Berle IX presentations and colloquy among all attendees shaped
my thinking on time horizons and helped produce the resulting articles that
are in conversation with one another. Each article contributes its own
perspective, evidence, and proposed interventions regarding investor time
horizons. This collection of articles, as a whole, is greater than any
contribution alone and provides an excellent primer for those new to
questions of investor time horizons as well as an advanced,
interdisciplinary examination of the issues for those who are already
experts. We owe a debt of gratitude to the contributing authors for sharing
their insights with us in this Issue.

